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COURTS, COPS, CITIZENS, AND CRIMINALS: HOW COURTS MISAPPLY SEIBERT
TO QUESTION-FIRST INTERROGATIONS AND HOW THEY CAN FIX IT
Justin D. Heminger*
“Do you know why we’re here?”1 This was Virginia
homicide Detective David W. Allen’s first question to Jayant
Kadian, who was suspected of killing his mother.2 “Yeah,”
Kadian replied, “because I stabbed my mom in the neck.”3
Immediately after that response, Detective Allen read Miranda
warnings to Kadian, who then confessed in chilling detail to the
murder.4
Detective Allen’s simple question and Kadian’s sur-
prising answer and subsequent confession eventually led to a
suppression hearing in a Virginia courtroom.5 At the hearing,
the judge suppressed the confession, relying on Missouri v.
Seibert,6 the United States Supreme Court’s fractured decision
which mandates suppression of some confessions obtained dur-
ing a question-first interrogation.7 The judge found that
Detective Allen’s initial “question ‘makes no particular sense
except as an attempt to [elicit] an incriminating response.’”8 As
the judge explained, “[A]sking such a question, then giving a
defendant Miranda warnings, then asking about the incident in
question makes a hash of the whole process of giving a defen-
dant notice of his rights.”9
However, in many, if not most, state and federal juris-
dictions across the United States, the judge’s ruling would be
reversed by an appellate court.  The hypothetical appellate
court’s opinion would begin by laying out the relevant Supreme
Court cases, starting with Miranda v. Arizona10 and United
States v. Dickerson,11 then moving to Oregon v. Elstad12 and
ending with Seibert.  The appellate court would explain that
both Elstad and Seibert addressed question-first situations,
where the police asked the suspect a question or began to inter-
rogate the suspect before reading the Miranda warnings, then
later read the suspect Miranda warnings and began asking ques-
tions again.  In Elstad, the Court allowed the subsequent warned
confession to be admitted into evidence during the prosecu-
tion’s case-in-chief, while in Seibert, the Court did not.   As this
Article explores, distinguishing between Elstad and Seibert is
complicated.
When analyzing Seibert, the hypothetical appellate
court would first observe that there was no majority opinion.
Then it would discuss United States v. Marks,13 where the Court
established the “narrowest grounds” doctrine, allowing lower
courts to identify or derive a controlling opinion or holding
from within one of the Court’s fractured decisions.  If the appel-
late court followed the majority approach to the Marks analysis,
the hypothetical court would quickly conclude that Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence was the controlling opinion.
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence only calls for exclud-
ing a postwarning statement where the interrogator deliberately
used a question-first strategy to obtain the statement.  It is the
deliberateness requirement that seems to be missing in Kadian’s
case, and that is why the judge’s decision to suppress Kadian’s
confession would be reversed by the hypothetical appellate
court.14 In Kadian’s case, the hypothetical became real when
the Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the judge’s suppres-
sion of Kadian’s statements and remanded the case for trial.15
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals of Virginia deci-
sion to reverse the trial court and allow Kadian’s confession
might ultimately be wrong.  Under a correct Marks analysis,
there is no controlling opinion in Seibert.  Therefore, when
given the choice, lower courts should address question-first
Miranda violations by applying the Seibert plurality opinion,
rather than Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.  The Fifth
Amendment declares that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,”16 and the
judiciary is the institution entrusted with the responsibility to
guard that constitutional right from state encroachment, includ-
ing the threat posed by question-first tactics.
The next part of this Article, Part II, traces the devel-
opment of Miranda jurisprudence, highlighting the four
Supreme Court decisions most relevant to question-first interro-
gations, Miranda, Elstad, Dickerson, and Seibert.  After laying
this foundation, Part III explores Marks as applied by the
Supreme Court and lower courts, ending with a survey of lower
court opinions applying Marks to Seibert.  Part IV explains
why, contrary to the majority approach, Justice Kennedy’s con-
currence is not the narrowest grounds in Seibert.  Part IV con-
cludes by proposing that, after Seibert, lower courts are free to
decide what rule to apply to question-first interrogations.
Taking the next logical step, Part V evaluates the four possible
approaches that lower courts might take to question-first inter-
rogations.  Part V concludes that the plurality test is the best
choice.  The Article concludes by exhorting courts to reflect
carefully upon the constitutional right at stake when police
obtain a confession through a question-first technique.
Beginning with Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme
Court has struggled to define the scope of the privilege against
self-incrimination, and, in particular, how to deal with question-
first interrogations.  Over the following decades, the Court cre-
ated exceptions to Miranda, including Elstad, which allowed
some confessions that could be products of question-first tactics
to be admitted.  In Dickerson, the Court answered the underly-
ing question of whether Miranda warnings are constitutionally
required.  Yet, the fractured decision in Seibert proves that the
debate over the privilege’s scope is ongoing and that the Court
still disagrees about how to handle confessions obtained
through question-first interrogations.17
Miranda v. Arizona
Miranda is relevant to question-first interrogations on
at least four levels.  First, Miranda was and is a constitutional
paradox: It went far beyond the Constitution’s text, yet pro-
I.  Introduction
II.  From Miranda to Seibert: The Supreme Court
Struggles with Its “Constitutional Role”
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scribed concrete constitutional rules.18 In the opening para-
graph, the majority explained that it was addressing the Fifth
Amendment privilege’s relationship to evidence and proce-
dure.19 That promise was fulfilled in the third section of the
opinion, which dictated the four Miranda warnings and proce-
dural rules for admitting warned confessions and excluding
unwarned confessions.20 Although the majority insisted that the
“decision in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket,”
encouraging Congress and the states to find alternatives to the
warnings,21 this was a false assurance. In reality, the majority
stated that Congress and the states would have to demonstrate
to the Court “procedures which are at least as effective” as the
warnings,22 a seemingly impossible challenge.  Therefore, on
its face, Miranda is invincible: It claims to be replaceable but
only by a rule that provides more protection for the privilege.23
Second, Miranda relied on two fundamental principles
that speak to the continuing debate over the privilege against
self-incrimination in question-first interrogations: personal
autonomy and evidentiary reliability.24 With respect to person-
al autonomy, the Court placed a high value upon the individual
defendant’s rights when juxtaposed against the interests of gov-
ernment and society as a whole.25 With respect to evidentiary
reliability, the Court was concerned that modern interrogation
techniques made confessions less reliable in the absence of an
advocate or impartial observer.26 The Miranda Court used both
the personal autonomy and evidentiary reliability principles to
justify placing a “heavy burden” on the government to “demon-
strate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his
privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or
appointed counsel.”27
Third, Miranda is relevant to question-first tactics
because it is an explicitly objective doctrine.28 Admittedly, the
majority considered the state of mind of the interrogator and the
suspect.29 The first section of the opinion focused entirely on
the many techniques law enforcement officers employed to pro-
duce a calculated result: an admission of guilt.30 However, in
the end, the majority chose an objective rule, from the Miranda
warnings to the knowing and intelligent waiver.31 In fact, the
majority emphatically rejected a subjective standard for deter-
mining whether the defendant knew his right to remain silent.32
Since Miranda, the Court has continued to debate the value of
subjective versus objective tests in protecting the privilege
against self-incrimination.33
Finally, the Miranda majority arguably addressed
question-first tactics, a point often overlooked.  When the
majority described its holding, it repeatedly declared that the
warnings must be given first, before any interrogation.34 The
Miranda majority also placed substantial value on the temporal
element of the warnings when applying its holding to the spe-
cific cases under review.35 The Court even went so far as to
treat one of the Miranda cases, Westover v. United States,36 as a
question-first interrogation.37
Oregon v. Elstad
Although Miranda initially appeared to be a bright-
line rule, the Court has since created many exceptions to
Miranda in its struggle to define the scope of the privilege
against self-incrimination.38 The exception most directly relat-
ed to question-first tactics is Oregon v. Elstad.39 In Elstad, the
Court held that when a suspect has made an unwarned, but vol-
untary admission, a subsequent warned and voluntary statement
is admissible.40 As Justice O’Connor wrote for the majority,
It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a
simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied
by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated
to undemine the suspect’s ability to exercise his free will,
so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent volun-
tary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeter-
minate period.41
Therefore, “absent deliberately coercive or improper
tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a sus-
pect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a pre-
sumption of compulsion.”42 Additionally, the Elstad majority
felt that a fifth Miranda warning, that the “prior statement could
not be used against” the suspect, was “neither practicable nor
constitutionally necessary.”43
The Elstad majority unambiguously rejected two argu-
ments for excluding the second statement.  It found neither the
“fruit of the poisonous tree”44 nor the “cat out of the bag”45 the-
ory justified excluding the second statement.  Consequently,
Elstad could have ended the question-first debate.  Twenty
years later, however, the Seibert Justices disagreed about how
to interpret Elstad.  The Seibert plurality interpreted Elstad as
creating a good-faith mistake exception for Miranda viola-
tions,46 while the Seibert dissent interpreted Elstad as requiring
all question-first interrogations to meet the traditional Fifth
Amendment voluntariness test.47 Separating from the other
eight Justices, Justice Kennedy interpreted Elstad as adequate-
ly addressing all interrogations except for deliberate two-step
interrogations.48 Elstad contains language that supports each
position, so it is not surprising that the Court disagreed.49
Dickerson v. United States
Dickerson v. United States50 is central to the discussion
of question-first tactics because the Court used Dickerson to
reaffirm Miranda’s constitutional nature.  In Dickerson, the
Court rejected Congress’ attempt to statutorily overrule
Miranda.51 The seven-justice majority, led by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, refused to allow Congress to overrule Miranda and,
relying on stare decisis principles, refused to overrule Miranda
itself.52
The Dickerson majority reaffirmed several key
Miranda doctrines.  First, the majority noted that “Miranda
announced a constitutional rule.”53 The majority reconciled
this statement with the Miranda exceptions by claiming that the
Miranda exceptions “illustrate the principle–not that Miranda
is not a constitutional rule–but that no constitutional rule is
immutable.”54 Second, the Dickerson majority admitted that
Miranda placed a higher cost on society because it was an
objective rule.  Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded: “The disad-
vantage of the Miranda rule is that statements which may be by
no means involuntary, made by a defendant who is aware of his
‘rights,’ may nonetheless be excluded and a guilty defendant go 
free as a result.”55 However, the Chief Justice and six other
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Justices believed that society still benefited from Miranda’s
objectivity because the alternative totality of the circumstances
test would be harder to administer.56
Missouri v. Seibert
Missouri v. Seibert57 represents the latest episode in
the Court’s quest to define the scope of the privilege against
self-incrimination.  In Seibert, the Court reconsidered the con-
stitutionality of question-first tactics in light of Elstad.  The
result was a fractured decision that left lower courts with the
task of finding constitutional law somewhere within four opin-
ions, none of which received more than four votes.
The Facts
The defendant in Seibert, Patrice Seibert, had a
twelve-year-old son, Jonathan, with cerebral palsy.58 When
Jonathan died in his sleep, Seibert was afraid she would be
charged with neglect because Jonathan had bedsores.59 Seibert
conspired with her other two sons and their friends to set fire to
their trailer house and burn Jonathan’s body in it.  To make the
plan complete, Seibert planned to leave another mentally ill
teenager, Donald Rector, in the trailer when they set it on fire.60
The fire was set, and Donald died in it.61
In the subsequent investigation, Seibert became a sus-
pect.  Before Seibert’s arrest, Officer Richard Hanrahan
instructed the arresting officer not to read Seibert her Miranda
rights.62 At the police station, Officer Hanrahan interrogated
Seibert for about half an hour, pressuring her to admit that
Seibert knew Donald would be left in the fire.63 When Seibert
admitted she knew, Officer Hanrahan gave her a break from the
questioning, read her Miranda warnings, obtained a signed
Miranda waiver, and then continued questioning Seibert.64
During the second interrogation, Officer Hanrahan walked
Seibert through her earlier statement, repeating questions and
even reminding her of answers she gave in the first interroga-
tion.   Eventually, Seibert confessed and was convicted.65
The Plurality Opinion
Justice Souter wrote for the plurality in Seibert, joined
by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer.66 The plurality first
observed that Miranda warnings were designed “to reduce the
risk of a coerced confession and to implement the Self-
Incrimination Clause.”67 The plurality explained that “Miranda
warnings are customarily given under circumstances allowing
for a real choice between talking and remaining silent.”68 But
the plurality found that law enforcement departments were pro-
moting question-first tactics to neutralize the effectiveness of
Miranda warnings.69 As the Miranda Court had done over thir-
ty years earlier, the plurality considered how the interrogation
practice would affect a suspect’s knowing and voluntary exer-
cise (or waiver) of the privilege against self-incrimination, as
protected through the Miranda warnings.70 For the plurality,
“[t]he threshold issue when interrogators question first and
warn later is thus whether it would be reasonable to find that in
these circumstances the warnings could function ‘effectively’ as
Miranda requires.”71 The plurality concluded that the warnings
were likely to be ineffective.72
Once the plurality concluded that question-first tactics
could make Miranda warnings ineffective, it turned to the State
of Missouri’s argument that Elstad was controlling.73 Justice
Souter declared that Missouri’s argument “disfigures” Elstad.74
Elstad, wrote Justice Souter, created a good-faith mistake
exception to Miranda, while the facts in Seibert “by any objec-
tive measure reveal a police strategy adapted to undermine the
Miranda warnings.”75 Elstad was therefore distinguishable
based on “a series of relevant facts that bear on whether
Miranda warnings delivered midstream could be effective
enough to accomplish their object.”76 These facts turned into a
five-factor test to measure the efficacy of Miranda warnings.77
Justice Breyer’s Concurrence
Justice Breyer wrote a brief concurrence in which he
declared that he “join[ed] the plurality’s opinion in full.”78
However, he wanted to apply the “fruit of the poisonous tree”
rationale which the Elstad majority had dismissed, and he
believed that the plurality’s approach would have that effect.79
Most importantly, Justice Breyer endorsed the good faith excep-
tion reading of Elstad that was vital to the plurality’s decision.80
Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence in the Judgment and Opinion
Playing Seibert’s Lone Ranger, Justice Kennedy con-
curred in the judgment but wrote a separate opinion.  He noted
that while he agreed with “much” of the plurality’s opinion, his
“approach does differ in some respects, requiring this separate
statement.”81 Justice Kennedy based his opinion on a practical
balancing of public and private interests inherent in interroga-
tions.82 He explained that the Miranda exceptions illustrated
this interest-balancing approach: “[N]ot every violation of the
[Miranda] rule requires suppression of the evidence obtained.
Evidence is admissible where the central concerns of Miranda
are not likely to be implicated and when other objectives of the
criminal justice system are best served by its introduction.”83
Justice Kennedy identified the central concerns of Miranda as
“‘the general goal of deterring improper police conduct’” and
“‘the Fifth Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy evi-
dence.’”84
Elstad, Justice Kennedy felt, properly balanced the
interests in most two-step interrogations.85 However, where
“[t]he police used a two-step questioning technique based on a
deliberate violation of Miranda,” the balance of interests shift-
ed because, when applied intentionally, the technique “distorts
the meaning of Miranda” and “furthers no legitimate counter-
vailing interest.”86 Therefore, when police deliberately
employed question-first tactics to violate Miranda, Justice
Kennedy believed that “postwarning statements that are related
to the substance of prewarning statements must be excluded
absent specific, curative steps.”87
In a crucial portion of his opinion,  Justice Kennedy
distinguished his approach from that of the plurality.88 He
wrote that the plurality’s “test envisions an objective inquiry
from the perspective of the suspect, and applies in the case of
both intentional and unintentional two-stage interrogations.”89
He explained, “In my view, this test cuts too broadly. . .  I
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would apply a narrower test applicable only in the infrequent
case, such as we have here, in which the two-step interrogation
technique was used in a calculated way to undermine the
Miranda warning.”90 Justice Kennedy envisioned Elstad as the
general rule and Seibert as the exception where “the deliberate
two-step interrogation was employed.”91
The Dissenting Opinion
Justice O’Connor, who wrote the Elstad majority opin-
ion, wrote the dissent in Seibert.  She applauded the plurality
for not applying a “fruit of the poisonous tree” analysis and for
not focusing on the interrogator’s subjective intent.92 Much of
the dissent was devoted to explaining why Justice Kennedy’s
use of subjective intent was wrong.93 However, the dissent dis-
agreed with the plurality about the need to protect the defendant
from coercion caused by the two-step interrogation tactic.94
Two-step interrogations should be “analyze[d] . . . under the
voluntariness standards central to the Fifth Amendment and
reiterated in Elstad.”95
On Subjective Versus Objective Standards
Although it only earned a footnote in the plurality’s
decision, the debate over objective versus subjective standards
in evaluating question-first interrogations is central to the dis-
agreement between the nine Seibert Justices.  Justice Kennedy
unambiguously endorsed the interrogator’s deliberate violation
of Miranda warnings as the triggering factor for a different con-
stitutional inquiry, arguably a subjective standard.  The dissent,
on the other hand, vehemently rejected subjective intent, thus
subscribing to an objective standard.  The real question is,
therefore, where the plurality falls in the debate.
When the plurality distinguished Elstad as a good-
faith mistake, it was relying on the officer’s intent to justify the
Miranda exception.96 On the other hand, the plurality quickly
differentiated the facts in Elstad from the facts in Seibert: “At
the opposite extreme are the facts here, which by any objective
measure reveal a police strategy adapted to undermine the
Miranda warnings.”97 This statement led to the footnote which
appeared to signal the plurality’s commitment to an objective
rather than subjective test: “Because the intent of the officer
will rarely be as candidly admitted as it was here (even as it is
likely to determine the conduct of the interrogation), the focus
is on facts apart from intent that show the question-first tactic at
work.”98 This footnote is consistent with the plurality’s objec-
tive threshold question, which questions the potential “effec-
tiveness” of Miranda warnings in light of question-first tactics,
disregarding the actual or likely intent of either the interrogator
or the suspect.99
Furthermore, at the end of the opinion, Justice Souter
clarified the objective nature of the plurality’s test.  The test is
objective from the reasonable person standard: “These [ques-
tion-first interrogation] circumstances must be seen as challeng-
ing the comprehensibility and efficacy of the Miranda warnings
to the point that a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes
would not have understood them to convey a message that she
retained a choice about continuing to talk.”100
One commentator has questioned whether “the plural-
ity foreclosed subjective characteristics entirely.”101
Admittedly, the plurality did not reject a subjective inquiry as
clearly as it found such an inquiry unhelpful and unnecessary.
The Court may resolve the objective-subjective debate when it
next considers question-first tactics.  Meanwhile, lower courts
attempting to understand Seibert should accept the basic prem-
ise that the plurality’s test is objective.  Otherwise, the quandary
posed by the fractured decision makes little sense.  Both the
plurality and Justice Kennedy agreed that the confession should
be suppressed.102 But Justice Kennedy distinguished his posi-
tion from that of the plurality by characterizing the plurality’s
test as “an objective inquiry from the perspective of the suspect
[that] applies in  the case of both intentional and unintentional
two-stage interrogations.”103 Finally, in her dissent, Justice
O’Connor praised the plurality for rejecting an intent-based
test.104
The Court will continue to debate the scope of the
privilege’s suppression remedy.  However, at least until the
Court’s next Miranda opinion, lower courts must play the cards
they have been dealt.  This means lower courts must scrutinize
Seibert in light of the Court’s guidance on fractured decisions to
determine what binding precedent applies to question-first
interrogations.
Because Seibert has no clear majority opinion, lower
courts addressing question-first tactics must decide whether one
or more of the four opinions in Seibert is, or contains, control-
ling precedent.  For lower courts, the most popular approach to
this question is to apply the “narrowest grounds” doctrine.  As
Part III.A explains, the Supreme Court developed the” narrow-
est grounds” doctrine in Marks v. United States,105 a First
Amendment obscenity case.  However, Part III.B notes that the
Court has been inconsistent in its own application of Marks,
recently failing in Grutter v. Bollinger106 to resolve a circuit
split on how Marks should be applied.  Despite the Court’s par-
tial silence on Marks, many lower courts have applied Marks to
Seibert.  As the jurisdictional survey in Part III.C shows, the
majority of lower courts that have applied a Marks analysis
have concluded that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is the con-
trolling opinion in Seibert.  However, a minority of lower courts
disagree with that analysis and offer logical alternatives.
United States v. Marks and the Narrowest Grounds
Doctrine
The “narrowest grounds” doctrine arose in United
States v. Marks107 as part of the Court’s resolution of long-
standing disagreements among the Justices over the First
Amendment status of obscenity.108 In Marks, the defendants
were charged with transporting obscene materials interstate.109
Their criminal conduct ended in February 1973.110 In June
1973, the Court decided Miller v. California,111 finally estab-
lishing, by majority opinion, a controlling precedent for obscen-
ity cases, including a new definition of obscenity.112 At trial,
the defendants argued that they should be tried under the defi-
nition of obscenity in the 1966 plurality opinion, Memoirs v.
Massachusetts,113 which they claimed constituted the Court’s 
III.  From Marks to Seibert: Plurality Opinions,
Concurrences, and the Narrowest Grounds Doctrine
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obscenity rule before Miller.114 The district court refused to
apply Memoirs and applied Miller’s more stringent test, under
which defendants were convicted.115
The Sixth Circuit heard the defendants’ appeal.116 In
their decision affirming the district court, the Circuit court
“noted correctly that the Memoirs standards never commanded
the assent of more than three Justices at any one time, and [the
court] apparently concluded from this fact that Memoirs never
became the law.”117 The circuit court reasoned that if Memoirs
was not controlling, then the last opinion where a majority of
the Supreme Court agreed would be the proper rule, and
because Miller was consistent with that earlier decision, it was
fair to use Miller to convict the defendants.118
The Supreme Court reversed.119 Justice Powell wrote
for the majority, “[W]e think the basic premise for this line of
reasoning is faulty.”120 He then stated what is now known as
the “narrowest grounds” doctrine: “When a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may
be viewed as that position taken by those Members who con-
curred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’”121
Justice Powell then analyzed Memoirs using the Narrowest
Grounds Doctrine:
Three Justices joined in the controlling opinion in
Memoirs.  Two others, Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice
Douglas concurred on broader grounds in reversing the
judgment below.  They reiterated their well-known posi-
tion that the First Amendment provides an absolute shield
against governmental action aimed at suppressing obscen-
ity.  Mr. Justice Stewart also concurred in the judgment,
based on his view that only ‘hardcore pornography’ may
be suppressed.  The view of the Memoirs plurality there-
fore constituted the holding of the Court and provided
governing standards. . . .  Materials were deemed to be
constitutionally protected unless the prosecution carried
the burden of proving that they were ‘utterly without
redeeming social value,’ and otherwise satisfied the strin-
gent Memoirs requirements.122
Justice Powell concluded that “Memoirs therefore was
the law,” and the defendants should have been tried under the
Memoirs standard for obscenity, rather than the new Miller
test.123 Thus was born the Marks narrowest grounds doctrine.
The Supreme Court’s (Non)application of the Narrowest
Grounds Doctrine
Commentators have criticized the “narrowest
grounds” doctrine because the Court itself has refused to apply
Marks to fractured decisions where lower courts struggled to
find the narrowest grounds.124 The most prominent example is
Grutter v. Bollinger,125 where the Court refused to apply a
Marks analysis to its fractured decision in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.126 In Bakke, Justice Powell
provided the fifth vote to strike down a particular race-con-
scious admissions program when the other eight justices were
split evenly.127 However, Justice Powell agreed with the dis-
sent that race could be a proper factor in higher education
admissions programs.128 After Bakke, lower courts applied
Marks to determine the holding in Bakke, concluding, at least in
some instances, that Justice Powell’s opinion controlled.129
However, when the Supreme Court decided Grutter, it refused
to do a Marks analysis of Bakke.130 Instead, it simply adopted
Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion as the rule in Grutter.131
The Court’s pattern of avoiding Marks has led some to
question how firmly the “narrowest grounds” doctrine binds
lower courts.132 One respected article describes the “narrowest
grounds” doctrine as “a doctrine of limited applicability.”133
The article concludes: 
[The “narrowest grounds” doctrine] is only useful where
the plurality and concurring opinions stand in a “broader-
narrower” relation to each other.  Many of the most
troublesome plurality opinions, however, do not fit into
this mold, and lower courts have been left to their own
devices to determine the precedential value of most plural-
ity opinions.134
The Court has failed to clarify the meaning of the doctrine,135
so it is appropriate to consider how lower courts have treated it.
An Alternative Perspective on the Narrowest Grounds
Doctrine
The United States Courts of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, the Third Circuit, and the Second Circuit have each
recognized that “the Marks ‘narrowest grounds’ doctrine is not
universally applicable.”136 But instead of avoiding its complex-
ities, as the Grutter Court did, these federal circuits have con-
fronted the “narrowest grounds” doctrine and reached a conclu-
sion: The “narrowest grounds” doctrine does not always pro-
vide an answer to the Court’s fractured decisions.
The District of Columbia Circuit, in King v. Palmer,137
was the first circuit to offer an alternative to a rigid application
of the “narrowest grounds” doctrine.  In King, the court had to
decide on the availability of contingency enhancements to attor-
neys’ fees.138 The Supreme Court’s most relevant opinion,
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean
Air139 (“Delaware Valley II”), was a fractured decision with a
four-Justice plurality in which Justice O’Connor concurred in
part and concurred in the judgment.140 Before King, the District
of Columbia Circuit had used Marks to find Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence in Delaware Valley II controlling.141 Upon recon-
sideration, however, the King majority found that Marks had a
more limited applicability than previously believed:
Marks is workable–one opinion can be meaningfully
regarded as "narrower" than another–only when one opin-
ion is a logical subset of other, broader opinions.  In
essence, the narrowest opinion must represent a common
denominator of the Court's reasoning;  it must embody a
position implicitly approved by atleast five Justices who
support the judgment.142
The King majority agreed that some of the Court’s fractured
decisions, such as Marks, were cases in which the “‘narrowest
grounds’ approach yielded a logical result.”143 However, the
King majority was concerned about some fractured decisions 
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where applying Marks raised serious problems:
When, however, one opinion supporting the judgment
does not fit entirely within a broader circle drawn by the
others, Marks is problematic.  If applied in situations
where the various opinions supporting the judg-ment are
mutually exclusive, Marks will turn a single opinion that
lacks majority support into national law.  When eight of
nine Justices do not subscribe to a given approach to a
legal question, it surely cannot be proper to endow that
approach with controlling force, no matter how persuasive
it may be.144
In King, the majority was unable to find enough “common
ground” between Justice O’Connor’s concurrence and the plu-
rality decision in Delaware Valley II to decide “when to apply
contingency enhancements.”145 Furthermore, the King majori-
ty was completely at a loss to try to perform a Marks analysis
on the question of “how the contingency enhancement should
be calculated.”146 Here, the King majority wrote, “We do not
see how either approach can be thought ‘narrower’ than the
other;  they are simply different.”147 As a result, the District of
Columbia Circuit was “left without a controlling opinion or a
governing test for awarding contingency enhancements under
Delaware Valley II.”148
Relying upon the reasoning in King, the Third Circuit,
in Rappa v. New Castle County,149 recognized that there must
be a “common denominator in the Court’s reasoning” before
Marks could be applied.150 The Rappa Court observed that
“[i]n some splintered decisions, there will be three or more dis-
tinct approaches, none of which is a subset of another; instead,
each approach is simply different.”151 Where there was no
common denominator, “no particular standard constitutes the
law of the land, because no single approach can be said to have
the support of a majority of the Court.”152
Recently, the Second Circuit applied the reasoning in
King and Rappa to reach a similar result in United States v.
Alcan Aluminum Corp.153 The court agreed with the King
majority that the “narrowest grounds” doctrine “works . . . only
when that narrow opinion is the common denominator repre-
senting the position approved by at least five justices.”154
Therefore, the court recognized that “[w]hen it is not possible
to discover a single standard that legitimately constitutes the
narrowest ground for a decision on that issue, there is then no
law of the land because no one standard commands the support
of a majority of the Supreme Court.”155
One commentator agreed with these circuit courts’
alternate perspective on the “narrowest grounds” doctrine:
“Marks provides no useful guidance in those cases in which dif-
ferent Justices take different approaches to the issues.  Such
decisions cannot be forced into the Marks ‘narrowest grounds’
mold because of the absence of any logical connection between
the concurring opinions.”156 In King, Rappa, and Alcan
Aluminum Corp., three federal circuits refused to blindly apply
Marks, choosing instead the uncertainty of finding no control-
ling rule.  One lesson to be gained from these decisions is that
lower courts should apply the narrowest grounds doctrine with
a critical eye.
A Survey of Lower Court Cases Applying Marks to Seibert
The following survey of cases in which lower courts
have applied the Marks “narrowest grounds” doctrine to
Seibert157 evaluates the majority and two minority approaches.
The majority of lower courts view Justice Kennedy’s opinion as
the narrowest grounds and, therefore, as controlling.  The
minority of lower courts take one of two positions: the first
group treats both the plurality’s and Justice Kennedy’s opinions
as controlling, avoiding the need to choose between them; the
second group, currently comprised of only two judges, holds
that Seibert does not have a narrowest grounds and, consequent-
ly, does not have a controlling opinion.
Majority Approach
A majority of courts that have applied the Marks “nar-
rowest grounds” doctrine to Seibert have concluded that Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence is the controlling opinion.  Among the
federal circuits, the Third,158 Fourth,159 Fifth,160 Seventh,161
Eighth,162 and Ninth163 Circuits have followed the majority
approach.  At the federal trial court level, judges on the district
courts for the District of Minnesota,164 the District of
Nebraska,165 the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,166 and the
Western District of Pennsylvania167 apply the majority
approach.  State appellate courts in the following states have
also followed the majority approach: California,168
Kentucky,169 Maryland,170 and Washington.171
The Ninth Circuit’s recent opinion in United States v.
Williams172 is an example of the majority approach.  After
describing Elstad and Seibert, the court noted that in Seibert,
“[a]lthough five Justices agreed that Seibert’s postwarning
statement was inadmissible, the case did not produce a majori-
ty opinion.”173 Therefore, lacking a majority opinion, the court
had to “decide how to interpret Seibert in light of these splin-
tered opinions.”174 Citing the Marks “narrowest grounds” doc-
trine, the court declared that it “need not find a legal opinion
which a majority joined, but merely ‘a legal standard which,
when applied, will necessarily produce results with which a
majority of the Court from that case would agree.’”175 The
court believed that “[t]o determine whether Seibert contains a
precedential holding, [it] must identify and apply a test which
satisfies the requirements of both Justice Souter’s plurality
opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.”176
The Williams court then applied Marks to Seibert.  The
court noted that while “the plurality would consider all two-
stage interrogations eligible for a Seibert inquiry, Justice
Kennedy’s opinion narrowed the Seibert exception to those
cases involving the deliberate use of the two-step procedure to
weaken Miranda’s protections.”177 The court found that the
plurality and Justice Kennedy agreed that confessions obtained
through a deliberate use of two-stage interrogations were inad-
missible.178 Consequently, “[t]his narrower test–that excludes
confessions made after a deliberate, objectively ineffective mid-
stream warning–represents Seibert’s holding.”179  All other
two-stage interrogations would still be controlled by Elstad’s
voluntariness test.180
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After establishing that Justice Kennedy’s test was con-
trolling, the Williams Court observed that Justice Kennedy
failed to provide guidance for what constituted a deliberate two-
step interrogation.181 The court believed that both objective and
subjective evidence should be considered when deciding if the
two-step interrogation was deliberate.182 This forced the court
to use the plurality’s five-factor test to analyze the facts for
deliberateness.183 Only if there was a deliberate two-step inter-
rogation would the court have to determine whether the mid-
stream warnings were effective.184 Again, the court believed
that it should “look both to the objective circumstances the plu-
rality cited . . . and to the curative measures [described by
Justice Kennedy]” to decide the effectiveness of the warn-
ings.185
The First Minority Approach
A minority of lower courts that have applied Marks to
Seibert have not found Justice Kennedy’s concurrence control-
ling.  These courts have followed one of several different
approaches.  The first minority approach is used by the
Eleventh Circuit,186 the United States District Courts for the
Northern District of Iowa,187 the Southern District of
Indiana,188 and the Court of Appeals of Alaska.189 It could be
called the “alternative argument” approach.  The alternative
argument is familiar to many lawyers from their law school
days, when professors instructed them to argue in the alterna-
tive on their exams; it also shares some similarities with the
concept of alternative pleading in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.190 Courts using the alternative argument approach
generally analyze the facts under both the plurality decision and
under Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.191 As long as the results
of the two analyses are the same, the courts do not specify
which analysis is outcome determinative.192
Courts use the alternative argument approach to avoid
committing to a position unless absolutely necessary.  However,
because the alternative argument approach does not resolve the
fractured decision dilemma, it is a delay tactic rather than a
solution.  At one time, the Eighth Circuit was in the alternative
argument camp, but as more panels heard question-first cases,
the circuit gradually pitched its tent further and further away
until it landed squarely in the majority approach’s camp.193 The
Eleventh Circuit will eventually face the same decision.
The Second Minority Approach
The second minority approach rejects Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence as the narrowest grounds and allows the
court to create its own rule.  So far, only two judges have
endorsed this approach.  The first is Ninth Circuit Judge Marsha
S. Berzon in her dissenting opinion in United States v.
Rodriguez-Preciado.194 Unlike the other two judges on the
panel in Rodriguez-Preciado who held that Seibert was not
applicable, Judge Berzon’s dissent reached the Seibert issue.195
Judge Berzon began her Marks analysis by explaining
that “[g]enerally, where there is no majority opinion, the nar-
rowest opinion adhered to by at least five Justices controls.
Applying the Marks rule to Seibert, however, is not a straight-
forward analysis.”196 In a subtle critique of Justice Kennedy’s
opinion, Judge Berzon conceded that Justice Kennedy’s reason-
ing was “arguably narrower” than the plurality’s but observed
in a footnote that it was Justice Kennedy himself who “charac-
terized his opinion as ‘narrower.’”197
Judge Berzon identified Justice Kennedy’s concur-
rence as focusing on the “deliberateness on the part of the
police–or lack thereof” rather than “the objective effectiveness
factors outlined in Justice Souter’s plurality opinion.”198
However, seven justices “decisively rejected any subjective
good faith consideration, based on deliberateness on the part of
the police.”199 This analysis led Judge Berzon to conclude that
Justice Kennedy’s opinion had the support of “two Justices, at
most” (because Justice Breyer had at least partially concurred in
Justice Kennedy’s opinion).200 Therefore, Marks did not pro-
vide a solution.201 The only answer that Marks provided was
that Justice Kennedy’s opinion could not be controlling.202
The next question facing Judge Berzon was what to do
if Justice Kennedy’s opinion was not controlling.203 Neither
the dissent nor the plurality was binding, thus, there was no
controlling precedent, and the Ninth Circuit was free to decide
the issue.204 Judge Berzon concluded that the Ninth Circuit
should adopt the plurality position, something other circuits had
done in similar situations.205 Subsequently, in United States v.
Williams,206 the Ninth Circuit refused to adopt Judge Berzon’s
analysis and went with the majority approach.207
Joan M. Azrack, the Chief United States Magistrate
Judge for the Eastern District of New York, also adopted the
second minority approach in United States v. Cohen.208 In
Cohen, Judge Azrack analyzed Seibert in light of Marks and
concluded that Justice Kennedy’s opinion could not be the “nar-
rowest grounds” for two reasons and, therefore, could not be
controlling.209 The first reason Justice Kennedy’s opinion was
not the “narrowest grounds” was that at least three of the
Justices in the plurality and the four dissenting Justices rejected
Justice Kennedy’s reliance on subjective intent.210 Therefore,
“Justice Kennedy’s rule, rejected by a large majority of the
court, cannot be Seibert’s holding.”211 As discussed above in
Part II.D.6, while the plurality did not explicitly reject a subjec-
tive standard, it endorsed an objective standard and implied that
a subjective standard was unnecessary and would normally be
worthless.212
The second reason Justice Kennedy’s concurrence was
not the narrowest grounds was that Justice Kennedy’s “analysis
. . . is ‘simply different’ than that articulated by the plurality, not
a logical subset.”213 This lack of congruence between Justice
Kennedy’s and the plurality’s positions meant that Marks could
not produce a satisfactory rationale for the holding in Seibert.214
In other words, although Justice Kennedy and the plurality
agreed about the result in Seibert, they did not agree about how
to reach the result in such a way that Justice Kennedy’s reason-
ing could be categorized as a subset of the plurality’s reason-
ing.215 Under such circumstances, Marks was not designed to
lead to a conclusion, and there was no possible narrowest hold-
ing.216
Judge Azrack relied upon the decision in Alcan
Aluminum Corp., where the Second Circuit explained,
“‘[W]hen it is not possible to discover a single standard that
legitimately constitutes the narrowest ground for a decision on
that issue, there is then no law of the land because no one stan-
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dard commands the support of a majority of the Supreme
Court.’”217 The only identifiable result from Seibert was that
“Elstad does not control all situations of question-first interro-
gations; that sometimes warned confessions related to previous
unwarned confessions must be suppressed.”218
Without a controlling opinion to apply, Judge Azrack
reasoned she was “left to devise a test to determine whether to
suppress statements made in a question-first situation, in other
words, to determine whether midstream Miranda warnings
could be considered effective.”219 Judge Azrack’s solution was
to synthesize the plurality’s five-factor test with Justice
Kennedy’s concern for curative measures to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the Miranda warnings.220 Applying this test, Judge
Azrack found the warnings were effective, and so the second
statement was admissible.221
No other court has yet taken the bold approach of
Judges Berzon and Azrack, but as Part IV explains, their
approach is one that courts should consider when faced with
question-first interrogations.
Despite what a majority of lower courts have held,
under a correct Marks analysis, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
in Seibert is not the narrowest grounds.  The majority approach
in applying Marks to Seibert is incorrect, as Section IV.A
explains.  The correct approach is the second minority
approach, which says that there is no narrowest grounds in
Seibert, and courts must therefore decide for themselves how to
handle statements derived from question-first interrogations,
the topic of Part V.
The Majority Approach to Seibert is Incorrect
The majority approach, using Marks to declare that
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is the controlling opinion in
Seibert, is incorrect for at least five reasons.  The first reason is
the most convincing: seven Justices disagreed with Justice
Kennedy.  With regard to the plurality, Justice Kennedy himself
noted their differences with him.222 As discussed above, the
plurality endorsed an objective test for question-first interroga-
tions and implicitly found a subjective inquiry unnecessary.223
Granted, the plurality did not shy away from calling question-
first tactics “a police strategy adapted to undermine the
Miranda warnings,”224 but the plurality immediately qualified
this recognition by explaining that “the focus is on facts apart
from intent that show the question-first tactic at work.”225 This
is at least partly “[b]ecause the intent of the officer will rarely
be as candidly admitted as it was” in Seibert.226 At the very
least, the four Justices comprising the plurality did not believe
that Justice Kennedy’s deliberateness test would adequately
protect suspects’ constitutional rights.227 Justice O’Connor,
speaking for the four dissenting Justices, was more outspoken
in her criticism of allowing the interrogator’s subjective intent
to play a role in admissibility determinations, stating, “I believe
that the approach espoused by Justice Kennedy is ill
advised.”228
In Rodriguez-Preciado, Judge Berzon suggests that
Justice Breyer’s concurrence indicates that he may agree with
Justice Kennedy on the intent issue.229 This is debatable, since
Justice Breyer joined in the plurality opinion in full and
endorsed a good-faith interpretation of Elstad.232 However, that
still leaves a seven-to-two majority rejecting Justice Kennedy’s
deliberateness test.231 While the Marks rule may be satisfied at
a highly theoretical and superficial level, it is paradoxical to
find that the “narrowest grounds” doctrine is satisfied under
such circumstances.232
The second reason the majority approach is incorrect
is that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is “simply different” than
the plurality’s opinion.233 The “narrowest grounds” doctrine
implies that one of the concurring opinions will be “narrower,”
but here “neither [of the analyses] is a logical subset of the
other.”234 The very nature of Justice Kennedy’s subjective
intent inquiry is different than the plurality’s objective, factor-
based test.235
The “simply different” concept is best illustrated by
two analogies from mathematics.  The first is the common
denominator, which, in mathematics, is a number by which two
other numbers are both divisible.  For example, a common
denominator of 4 and 6 is 2.  The three federal circuits that have
found an alternative approach to Marks each believed that only
a common denominator in legal reasoning between two non-
majority opinions could be the narrowest grounds.236 If two
opinions did not have a common denominator, there could be
no narrowest grounds between them.  Consistent with the prin-
ciples in King, Rappa, and Alcan Aluminum Corp., Judge
Berzon and Judge Azrack found no common denominator
between Justice Kennedy’s concurrence and the plurality’s
opinion in Seibert because Justice Kennedy’s reasoning was
“simply different” than the plurality’s.237 Justice Kennedy
focused on the deliberate nature of the interrogation while the
plurality focused on the circumstances of the interrogation.238
The second mathematical analogy is to Venn diagrams,
in which groups or collections of objects or things (called “sets”
in mathematics) are drawn as circles that may (1) overlap
entirely; (2) overlap partially; or (3) not overlap at all.  The
King court described this principle in layman’s terms: “Marks is
workable–one opinion can be meaningfully regarded as ‘nar-
rower’ than another–only when one opinion is a logical subset
of other, broader opinions.”239 Although the result from Justice
Kennedy’s and the plurality’s tests could overlap partially, the
reasoning–the “grounds” used to reach the result–does not
overlap: In one case, the grounds are the subjective intent of the
interrogator, in the other, the circumstances of the interroga-
tion.240 As Judge Berzon summarized this analysis, “The only
point not enjoying the assent of five Justices is the appropriate
admissibility standard to apply [to exceptions to Elstad], on
which the Court is split 4-1-4.”241 Echoing Judge Berzon,
Judge Azrack wrote, “Only a recognition that deliberate cir-
cumvention of Miranda is unconstitutional [the partially over-
lapping result], but for different reasons and after separate
analyses [the grounds], binds the plurality and Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence.”242 The reasoning in Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence is “simply different,” so his opinion is
not the narrowest grounds upon which the plurality agreed with
him; the narrowest grounds upon which the plurality agreed
with Justice Kennedy is his concurrence in the judgment.
IV.  Why Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence in Seibert is Not
the “Narrowest Grounds”
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At least three other criticisms may be leveled at the
majority approach to the Marks-Seibert question.  The first crit-
icism is that the majority approach relies upon circular reason-
ing.  Some lower court opinions, rather than thoroughly apply-
ing Marks, rely upon Justice Kennedy’s own characterization of
his opinion as “narrower” to justify finding that Justice
Kennedy’s opinion is the narrowest grounds.243 Citing to
Justice Kennedy’s self-interpretation short-circuits the neces-
sary legal reasoning.
The second criticism is that some lower courts that
applied Marks to Seibert were hasty in their consideration of the
issues and did not fully evaluate how the Supreme Court and
the federal circuits have applied Marks in the past.244 Courts
need to make decisions based on imperfect guidance from the
Supreme Court; however, several circuits, including the Eighth
and the Eleventh, at least temporarily avoided making a hasty
decision through the alternative argument approach.245
The final criticism is that Elstad already encompasses
most circumstances that would arise under Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence.  Even Justice Kennedy admits his test would
“apply . . . only in the infrequent case” where question-first tac-
tics were deliberately employed; he would place most interro-
gations under Elstad’s voluntariness test.246 However, as the
Seibert dissent notes, Patrice Seibert’s second statement might
still be suppressed under Elstad.247 Any time the interrogator
affirmatively expresses a subjective intent to violate Miranda
through the question-first tactic, the interrogator will probably
also use other coercive techniques that would make both the
pre- and post-warning interrogations involuntary.
The Second Minority Approach to Seibert is Correct
The second minority approach embodies the correct
application of the “narrowest grounds” doctrine to Seibert.  As
discussed in Part IV.A above, both Judge Berzon and Judge
Azrack properly concluded that Marks did not lead to a “nar-
rowest ground” between the plurality’s opinion and Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence.  To the contrary, these two judges
believed that it would be counterintuitive and unsound for
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence to be the controlling opinion
under Marks.248 This principle was supported by the Second
Circuit, the D.C. Circuit, and, implicitly in Grutter, the
Supreme Court: Where the “narrowest grounds” doctrine can-
not produce a logical basis for the judgment, it is counterpro-
ductive to try to create one.249
While rejecting Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as the
narrowest grounds, Judge Berzon and Judge Azrack recognized
that something must be drawn from Seibert.250 Judge Azrack
identified that something as simply “the specific result” and
went on to observe that “[a] fair characterization [of the result]
is that Elstad does not control all situations of question-first
interrogations; that sometimes warned confessions related to
previous unwarned confessions must be suppressed.”251 What
those situations are is a matter for lower courts to decide.252
If there is no controlling precedent for at least some
question-first scenarios, lower courts must “decide how to
decide” the admissibility of defendants’ statements obtained
through question-first interrogations.253 Courts have four
options, ranked here by merit: (1) adopt the plurality opinion;
(2) synthesize Justice Kennedy’s concurrence with the plurality
opinion; (3) adopt Justice Kennedy’s concurrence; or (4) devise
a new test.  The best of these options is the first.
Courts Should Adopt the Plurality Opinion
Given the choice, courts should adopt the Seibert plu-
rality opinion.  The Constitution guarantees to each person the
right to not “be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.”254 The judiciary is the institution entrusted to
protect this constitutional right from being trampled or abused
by the other two branches of government.  For fifty years now,
the judiciary has defended the privilege through Miranda warn-
ings.  Today, question-first tactics threaten the efficacy of those
warnings.
Most importantly, the plurality opinion protects the
efficacy of the Miranda warnings from being manipulated by
the state.  As the Seibert plurality observed, the state often gains
a benefit from giving Miranda warnings because the warnings
almost always ensure that subsequent statements will be admis-
sible for purposes of proving guilt.255 However, this “virtual
ticket of admissibility”256 presumes that the suspect’s constitu-
tional rights have been provided to him.  Question-first tactics
manipulate this guarantee by withholding those rights at the
moment a suspect most needs to know them, when he is in cus-
tody and facing interrogation.257 The Miranda Court instituted
the warnings because it was primarily concerned with psycho-
logical, rather than physical, coercion in interrogations.258
When facing question-first interrogations, courts face the same
question: Should the state be permitted to take advantage of a
suspect’s psychological vulnerability?  The plurality opinion’s
five-factor test allows courts to wrest ultimate control over the
interrogation out of the hands of law enforcement.  While a
police officer may swear from the stand that she did not intend
to violate Miranda by questioning first, the trial court can assess
“the completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the
first round of interrogation” and “the overlapping content of the
two statements” to decide for itself whether the state manipulat-
ed the efficacy of Miranda warnings.259
The plurality opinion also prevents the state from turn-
ing the Miranda warnings against the suspect.  Withholding the
warnings when the suspect most needs them and giving them to
him when the state most needs them is like grabbing the sus-
pect’s constitutional shield, turning it into a sword, and attack-
ing him with it.  The primary purpose of Miranda warnings is
to protect the suspect’s privilege against self-incrimination, not
to assist the state in eliciting a confession from the suspect (this
is a by-product of the warnings).  The Miranda Court believed
that it was the state’s job to prosecute the suspect, and courts
were therefore charged with the responsibility of ensuring that
the state did not depend upon “the cruel, simple expedient of
compelling [incriminating evidence] from [the suspect’s] own
mouth.”260 The Seibert plurality’s test, by requiring the warn-
ings to precede any questioning, prevents the state from timing
Miranda warnings to its advantage.
V.  What Should Courts Do?
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Besides providing appropriate protection for constitu-
tional rights, the Seibert plurality opinion is consistent with
Miranda, with the most relevant Miranda cases, and with the
Court’s general criminal procedure jurisprudence.  First, at the
most basic level, the plurality opinion is consistent with
Miranda itself.  The plurality is consistent with Miranda’s orig-
inal holding, which requires warnings to be given before any
interrogation begins.261 The plurality opinion is also consistent
with Miranda’s quasi-constitutional nature because it protects
the Fifth Amendment privilege with a judicially-created, fact-
based procedural mechanism to protect the privilege.262
Finally, the plurality opinion is consistent with Miranda’s two
rationales, personal autonomy and evidentiary reliability.263
With respect to personal autonomy, the objective factor-based
test prevents interrogators from using psychological manipula-
tion or coercion to obtain a confessions from their subjects and
imposes a threshold of conduct which an interrogator may not
cross without risking exclusion of the defendant’s statements.264
With respect to evidentiary reliability, the plurality opinion is
consistent with two principles the Miranda Court expressed:
Courts will not question whether the test must be met in partic-
ular cases, but if the test is met, there is a “virtual guarantee” of
admissibility.265
The plurality opinion is consistent with the most rele-
vant Miranda cases, Elstad and Dickerson.  It treats Elstad as a
good-faith mistake exception, which “pos[es] no threat to warn-
first practice generally.”266 At the same time, it supports
Dickerson’s reaffirmation of the “constitutional character” of
Miranda by responding to a “new challenge to Miranda” with
new prophylactic protections, refusing to return to what the
Seibert plurality calls the “old way of doing things” through a
case-by-case voluntariness determination.267
Furthermore, the plurality opinion is consistent with
the Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence.  Justice
O’Connor devotes over three pages of her dissent to this topic,
during which she praises the plurality for rejecting both the fruit
of the poisonous tree analysis and Justice Kennedy’s intent-
based test.268 Justice O’Connor found the plurality’s opinion to
be consistent with several of the Court’s criminal procedure
cases, including Moran v. Burbine, New York v. Quarles, United
States v. Patane, Harris v. New York, United States v. Leon, and
Whren v. United States.269
Finally, as Judge Berzon observed in Rodriguez-
Preciado, several federal circuits have adopted Supreme Court
plurality decisions in other contexts, relying on them as persua-
sive authority rather than binding precedent.270 This is the
course that Judge Berzon ultimately recommends.271 For all of
these reasons, the plurality opinion is the best approach a court
could choose to respond to the new challenge posed by ques-
tion-first tactics.
Courts Should Not Synthesize Justice Kennedy’s
Concurrence with the Plurality Opinion
Another option for lower courts deciding how to eval-
uate the admissibility of postwarning statements is to synthesize
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence with the plurality opinion.
There are many ways to synthesize the plurality opinion with
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.  The first minority approach to
the Marks analysis of Seibert is the most logical synthesis
because it applies both the plurality’s five-factor test and Justice
Kennedy’s deliberateness inquiry.  While this approach would
seem to honor the merits of the plurality without ignoring
Justice Kennedy’s contribution, incorporating a “deliberate-
ness” inquiry would be unhelpful in most cases and could dis-
tract courts from more important questions.
If the synthesis relies heavily on the “deliberateness”
inquiry in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, it would conflict with
the views of at least seven of the Seibert Justices.272
Furthermore, in practice, an inquiry into an officer’s subjective
intent would likely be unfruitful.    As the plurality argued,
rarely will an officer testify to a judge that the officer did his
best to violate Miranda.273 More than likely, the officer will
swear that he never intended to violate Miranda, and this will
give him an opportunity to explain away the circumstances of
the interrogation.  In the end, “deliberateness” would only be
helpful if the state chose to shoot itself in the foot by admitting
that it tried to violate Miranda.  In all other situations, the delib-
erateness inquiry would simply distract the court from evaluat-
ing the circumstances of the interrogation.  Even the Ninth
Circuit, in Williams, found that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
did not provide sufficient guidance for determining “deliberate-
ness,” forcing the court to rely upon the plurality’s five-factor
test.274
A less controversial synthesis would incorporate
Justice Kennedy’s “curative measures” into the plurality test.
For example, the plurality and Justice Kennedy each place some
weight upon the absence of an additional warning that a previ-
ously made, unwarned statement may be inadmissible.275 This
is essentially Judge Azrack’s approach in Cohen.276 Judge
Azrack applied the plurality’s five-factor test, but he identified
where Justice Kennedy’s curative measures fit into the fac-
tors.277 Nevertheless, before endorsing any synthesis, courts
should acknowledge that it is something on which the Justices
themselves were unable to agree.
Courts Should Not Adopt Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence
The third possible option for lower courts deciding
what test to apply to question-first interrogations is to rely on
Justice Kennedy’s test. Besides the concerns expressed by the
plurality and dissent in Seibert, it is worthwhile to consider
another defect in the subjective test: the burden of proof.  One
commentator notes that Justice Kennedy’s “new bad faith test
shifts an impossible and inappropriate burden onto the defen-
dant, who must now prove that a particular police officer acted
in bad faith.”278 This requirement “creates the risk that future
pretrial Miranda hearings will devolve into credibility battles
focused on irrelevant and unanswerable questions inevitably
won by the men and women in blue.”279 Under most circum-
stances, the state would be foolish to admit bad faith, so the
defendant will have to prove intent circumstantially.  And even
if the initial burden of proof was manageable, Justice
Kennedy’s test allows the state to redeem itself after the fact by
applying cheap “Band-Aides” in the form of curative measures,
which could be as simple as a fifth-warning.280
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Courts Could Devise a New Test
The last option for courts deciding how to address
question-first interrogations is to devise an entirely new test.  In
this context, five sitting Justices have already declared their
positions.  However, with Chief Justice John Roberts and
Associate Justice Samuel Alito joining the Court since Seibert
was decided, the Supreme Court’s Miranda jurisprudence
should continue to evolve, and this could allow lower courts to
explore new solutions to question-first tactics.
At the end of this Article, it is worthwhile to return to
its beginning–to return to Miranda.  When Chief Justice
Warren, in Miranda, recounted the historical development of
the privilege against self-incrimination, he observed that “[t]he
privilege was elevated to constitutional status and has always
been ‘as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to
guard.’”281 Chief Justice Warren believed that the Court was
compelled to honor that principle: “We cannot depart from this
noble heritage.”282 Today’s courts are no less obligated to pro-
tect the constitutional rights and privileges of its citizens, and
the scope of those rights and privileges must remain “as broad
as the mischief against which [they] seek to guard.”283
Although there has been much debate over the Seibert Justices’
positions, all nine Justices acknowledged the potential for mis-
chief caused by question-first interrogations.
On a normative level, a correct Marks analysis shows
that Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Seibert is not the narrowest
grounds and is, therefore, not controlling.  On a positive level,
courts should consider Miranda’s underlying policies in light of
the mischief caused by question-first tactics before selecting a
governing standard.
One may argue that a particular defendant, such as
Jayant Kadian, does not “deserve” the rights and privileges
which he or she is granted under the Constitution, particularly
when that privilege is given effect by courts.  Nevertheless, the
Constitution does not govern only that defendant.  The
Constitution governs courts, cops, citizens, and criminals, and
that is why Chief Justice Warren’s statement is still true today:
“We cannot depart from this noble heritage.”
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